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Keynes, Chicago and Friedman
Chapter 1: The Initial Controversyi
Robert Leeson
14 August 2002
1.1 Introduction
During the middle third of the twentieth century, the ideas of John Maynard Keynes
and those who described themselves as “Keynesians” acquired a profound influence
over both the economics profession and the macroeconomic policy process. After the
publication of Milton Friedman’s (1956) Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,
Keynesians were obliged to compete with “monetarists” for policy and intellectual
influence.ii These two volumes examine aspects of this counter-revolution by
focusing on Friedman’s claim that he was merely formalising the macroeconomic
ideas of the first generation Chicago School, at whose “feet” he “sat” in 1932-3 and
1934-5 (Friedman chapter 7 [1972/1974], 163).
In his introductory chapter ‘The Quantity Theory of Money – A Restatement’
Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 3-4) launched the monetarist counter-revolution
accompanied by the assertion that “Chicago was one of the few academic centres at
which the quantity theory continued to be a central and vigorous part of the oral
tradition throughout the 1930’s and 1940’s”. Friedman sought to “nurture” the
revival of the quantity theory by linking it to this Chicago “oral tradition”. According
to Friedman the “flavor” of this oral tradition was captured in a model in which the
quantity theory was “in the first instance a theory of the demand for money”.
Friedman did not intend to offer “a full justification” for his “assertion” adding that to
“the best of my knowledge no systematic statement of this theory as developed at
Chicago exists, though much of it can be read between the lines of [Henry] Simons’
and [Lloyd] Mints’s writings”. Friedman also enlisted the names of two co-editors of
the Journal of Political Economy (JPE) Frank Knight and Jacob Viner (1929-45) in
support of his assertion.
Don Patinkin studied at Chicago between 1941-47, a few years after Friedman; both
had been taught monetary economics at Chicago by Mints.iii Patinkin analysed his
1944 notes from Mints’ Economics 330 and found no evidence to sustain Friedman’s
account of the nature of the Chicago monetary tradition. There had previously been
other attempts to construct oral traditions and lineages; but none generated as much
heat – and light - as this. This introductory chapter sets the Patinkin-Friedman dispute
in its political and ideological context and also describes some of these other lineage
assertions and disputes.
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 241, 253, 256) began his assault with “an apology
for being over a decade late”. The “nominal” justification was the recent publication
of Friedman’s (chapter 4 [1968]) encyclopaedia essay on the quantity theory in which
the Chicago School, its individual members, and Studies in the Quantity Theory of
Money are not mentioned.iv Indeed, in the offending sentence of that encyclopaedia
entry, Friedman (chapter 4 [1968], 439) did not even refer to his own work. Instead,
he referred to an essay by Harry Johnson: “The postwar period has also seen a return
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to analysis in terms of the quantity equation accompanied by a reformulation of the
quantity theory that has been strongly affected by the Keynesian analysis of liquidity
preference (Johnson 1962)”.v Since Patinkin acknowledged that in 1968 Friedman
had already “admitted” his “intellectual indebtedness” to “modern Keynesian
monetary theory” this suggests that Patinkin’s assault may have a “real” cause: the
increased potency of Friedman’s macroeconomic advocacy and ideology, relative to
the mid-1950s. In a posthumously published essay, Patinkin (1995, 361-2) stated that
in his judgement, Friedman returned to Chicago in 1946 “to continue the school’s
fundamental ideological advocacy of free-market economic liberalism”.
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money was published mid-way between Herbert
Hoover’s defeat in 1932 and Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980.vi Hoover’s defeat by
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932 produced a “political watershed” equivalent to
that later created by Reagan’s victory in 1980: the 1860-1932 era of Republican
ascendancy gave way to the 1932-1980 era of Democrat ascendancy (Friedman and
Friedman 1980, 331-2; 1984, 4).vii Reagan’s election was regarded as the death of the
New Deal (Graham 1989, 75); it initiated a period of increased policy influence for
Friedman and other Hoover Institution economists.
Political watersheds often occur in conjunction with changes in the intellectual
climate. The President and Chairman of Citibank recalled that as a result of the
research undertaken by Friedman and his students “every Friday afternoon, a kind of
eerie silence settled over the normally boisterous trading rooms on Wall Street. The
computer screens started going blank at about 4.20 as traders waited for the 4.30
announcement of the M1 and M2 figures. The quantity theory of money had come to
Wall Street” (Wriston 1998, 2). Almost half a century earlier, the Chicago Tribune
reported that after Roosevelt’s victory the quantity theory had come to Washington
with the “brains trust”: “All Washington is going to school to the professors …
Debutantes hang on their exposition of the quantitative theory of money” (cited by
Leuchtenburg 1968 [1933], 50).viii
Three students of the first generation largely created the second-generation Chicago
School: Friedman, W. Allen Wallis and George Stigler. According to Stigler (1969,
229), an incumbent was “A person of the liveliest interest to the outcumbents”. In
1952, Adolf Berle, a prominent New Dealer, attempted to persuade Senator Paul
Douglas, an important inter-war University of Chicago economist, to seek the
Democratic Party Presidential nomination (Schwartz 1987, 295; see also Douglas
1972, 193-4). Twelve years later Berle (1973 [1964], 795) confided to his diary:
“Goldwater has picked up Milton Friedman, the economist of the University of
Chicago, straight out of the old laissez faire group. He will make the campaign a
referendum on everything that has happened since Roosevelt was elected in 1932, and
his crowd mean to go for broke … The worst elements in American reaction have
their day”.
1.2 The Importance of Lineage and Tradition
Friedman sought to explain the “transition from the overwhelming defeat of Barry
Goldwater in 1964 to the overwhelming victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 - two men
with essentially the same programme and the same message” (Friedman and Friedman
1982, viii). One partial explanation was lineage. Goldwater was pilloried for using the
phrase “Extremism in defence of liberty is no vice”; Friedman reflected that the
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reaction would have been so different “if Goldwater had introduced the statement by
‘as Cicero said more than two thousand years ago’” (Friedman and Friedman 1998,
368-9).ix
Friedman (1953, 3-5) found a lineage for his methodology of positive economics in
John Neville Keynes’ (1891) Scope and Method of Political Economy. Friedman
suggested that the “progress” of such a method of research could allow differences of
opinion among “disinterested citizens” to be “eliminated”, unlike value judgement
disputes, about which “men can ultimately only fight”.x Friedman (1977) also found
a lineage with which to conclude his Nobel Prize Lecture - a quotation from Pierre du
Pont to the French National Assembly of 1790: “Gentlemen, it is a disagreeable
custom to which one is too easily led by the harshness of the discussion to assume evil
intentions. It is necessary to be gracious as to intentions; one should believe them
good and apparently they are; but we do not have to be gracious at all to inconsistent
logic or to absurd reasoning. Bad logicians have committed more involuntary crimes
than bad men have done intentionally”. But Friedman was suspected of attempting to
perpetrate an ideological coup as du Pont and his fellow Physiocrats had done.xi Thus
some of Friedman’s opponents exhibited “a bitterness beyond reason” – attributed by
Donald McCloskey (1986) to the widespread professional acceptance of Friedman’s
methodology of positive economics.
According to a University of Chicago Public Policy Pamphlet discussion of monetary
policy, “tradition … is stronger than logic” and could thus be a crucial factor in the
“tactical” process by which policy is formulated and propagated (Whittlesey 1935,
24-5). Tradition and lineage were important not only to Friedman but also to his
fellow Mt. Pelerin Society libertarians. In his Opening Address to the Society,
Frederick von Hayek (1967 [1947], 158) highlighted the importance of lineage by
proposing the name “Acton-Tocqueville Society”.xii In a University of Chicago
Public Policy Pamphlet, Hayek (1939, 24, n15) stated that “There can be little doubt
that the existence of firm tradition has materially helped to preserve free institutions
in the Western world, just as its absence has contributed to their downfall in central
Europe”.xiii According to Stigler (1988) “There was no Chicago School of Economics
when the Mt. Pelerin Society first met”.
While Friedman’s (1953; 1957) methodology and permanent income hypothesis
entered the economics mainstream, his monetary research was initially regarded as the
work of an eccentric. Meghnad Desai (1981, 2) went as far as to suggest that prior to
the publication of A Monetary History of the United States (Friedman and Schwartz
1963), Friedman’s use of the quantity theory was regarded as “a peculiar Chicago
madness, indulgently mocked”. According to Robert Barro (1998, 5), Friedman had
been treated as a “right-wing midwestern crank. Most of the derision applied to his
views on money”.
Neither Desai nor Barro were dispassionate observers; but according to an
unpublished Massachusetts Institute of Technology doctoral dissertation on the
‘Demand and Supply Functions for Money in the United States’, the implications of
Friedman’s results were “limited because the definitions and formulations used are
somewhat idiosyncratic, thus insulating his work from the main stream of research
effort in the monetary area … we here neglect our conceptual misgivings about the

4
Friedman approach, allow him his definitions for the sake of argument, and attempt to
show that his approach appears to be empirically inferior” (Teigen 1962, 31, 170).xiv
Eccentrics or “cranks” can help define the boundaries of professional respectability.
Prior to 1936, acceptance of the quantity theory was, for some, the touchstone of
professional reliability. For example, Edwin Kemmerer (1935, 66), of Princeton
University, concluded that “it can be said, without fear of successful contradiction,
that a large majority of scientific economists, both in the United States and abroad,
who have worked intensively in the field monetary theory, accept some form of the
quantity theory of money”.xv Kemmerer (1934a, 174, 51, 56, 77, viii, 151) was
alarmed by his belief that the U.S. money supply had increased by 59% between June
1926 and March 1934, resulting in a “59-cent dollar”. The Federal Reserve banks
could, he argued, control the money supply but not their velocities: “You can lead a
horse to water but you can’t make him drink”.xvi These velocities were “questions of
business confidence and prospects, of hopes and fears, of emotions and prejudices”.
According to Kemmerer (1933, 134; 1934b) there was a direct relationship between
velocity and business confidence and therefore the “vigorous reflation program of the
Federal Reserve banks” had been counter-productive because it had weakened the
confidence of the business community”.xvii
Kemmerer (1934a) opposed “the money cranks … a mass of barnacles so bright in
appearance and with such clinging properties”. After attending the 1932 American
Economic Association (AEA) proceedings, Richard Kahn (30 January 1933) wrote to
Keynes from Chicago complaining that American economists were “still living in the
Dark Ages. It was all about the helplessness of trying to expand the economy … the
dead hand of Kemmerer hung heavy on most of the proceedings … I am thinking that
the only way to save humanity is to lead a campaign against the Quantity Theory. I
tried it on the [University of Chicago] Graduate Club here and they didn’t very much
like it, but didn’t quite know what to say. These people can see nothing absurd in the
president elect being 'opposed to currency inflation but in favour of credit inflation'. I
am enjoying the spectacle”.xviii
Keynes (JMK XIII [1935], 546, 552; 1936, 351) realised that cranks could also be
resurrected as neglected heretics “which the classics have treated as imbecile for the
last hundred years ... I am not really being so great an innovator, except as against the
classical school, but have important predecessors and am returning to an age-long
tradition of common sense ... which deserves rehabilitation and honour”.xix As a
result of the post-1936 Keynesian revolution, adherents of the quantity theory were
relegated to “crank” status. Until the late 1960s, that is, when Friedman was
transformed from “pariah to priest” (Barro 1998, 6). Entering the temple, he turned
the tables on those who had changed “Money” into Keynesian “Macroeconomics”.
For this rebellion against the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis, Patinkin sought to
have him, if not crucified, then permanently separated from his claimed parentage.xx
Patinkin explained to his students at the University of Western Ontario (19th
November 1973) that with respect to “Friedman vs. everyone else – after having said
everything they could think about one another, they started on their respective
intellectual forefathers – and in this context, the worst thing that you can say about
your opponent that he’s a bastard – or at best an intellectual bastard. That he really
isn’t the son of the intellectual father he is claiming for himself. That he really
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doesn’t understand the teachings of his alleged fathers – and that his opponent is
really the legitimate descendent” (see Backhouse 2002).xxi
1.3 Monetarists and Keynesians
Those who opposed the New Deal were tainted by the “mark of Cain” (Conkin 1968,
51); until shortly before Patinkin’s assault, the ‘mark of Chicago’ was perceived to
have inspired Friedman’s monetarism. For example, Walter Heller (1969, 40-1),
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) under both President Kennedy
and President Johnson, stated that “the Chicago School just goes rolling along” with
“great consistency over the years”. Heller’s remarks were made in a widely reported
debate on monetary policy with Friedman on 14 November 1968, a few days after
Richard Nixon’s election victory. In response, Friedman (1969, 45) - obviously
aware that his remarks would be scrutinised for hints about Nixon’s economic policy declared that he would “speak not for any mythical Chicago School, nor for any
administration or candidate, but for myself”.
Friedman (1968) had just completed the theoretical structure of the monetarist
counter-revolution with his “natural rate of unemployment” AEA Presidential
Address. After Nixon’s victory it was widely expected that Friedman would exert a
considerable influence on American economic policy. Paul McCracken, Nixon’s
CEA chairman, declared himself to be “Friedmanesque” (cited by Blumenthal 1986,
109, 111). When Arthur Burns became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board this
was regarded (somewhat inaccurately) by James Tobin (chapter 10 [1981], 30) as the
“1970 conversion” to monetarism. Between 1973-5, there were two monetary
revolutions (domestic and international) which were closely connected to Friedman’s
advocacy: the destruction of the post war system of fixed exchange rates and the
widespread adoption of the rule of targeting monetary aggregates based on the
expectation that the demand for money was a stable relationship.xxii
Since Simons’ (1962 [1936]) classic essay on “Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary
Policy” the Chicago School had been regarded as the “rules party” (Selden 1962,
323).xxiii According to Simons (1948 [1945], 308) the New Deal had delegated arbitrary
power to a series of agencies. This “high-road to dictatorship” was “terrifying” for “an
old-fashioned liberal”. Elevating the “government of men” over the “government of
rules” was tantamount to “accepting or inviting fascism”. Simons was interpreted as
undertaking a process of “public indoctrination with the new rules of the game so that
a new ‘religion of money’ can be built up ‘around which might be regimented strong
sentiments against tinkering with the currency’” (Gideonse 1938, 13).xxiv
An early version of Friedman’s case for flexible exchange rates can be found in
Simons’ (1934, 53-4) ‘Money and the New Deal’. Mints (1950, 115) also stated that
“the essential problem of monetary policy can be stated as that of ‘rules versus
discretion’”. According to Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 163) this Chicago
tradition provided immunity from the Keynesian virus: “the small minority of
economists who did not succumb to the Keynesian revolution consisted
disproportionately of Chicago-trained economists … so far as policy was concerned,
Keynes had nothing to offer those of us who sat at the feet of Simons, Mints, Knight
and Viner”.
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Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money and Friedman’s “Restatement” of the
quantity theory was published in the same year as Money, Interest, and Prices –
Patinkin’s (1956) attempt to codify the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis. In the
ensuing controversy, Patinkin sought to provide ‘A Restatement of Keynesian
Economics’. Patinkin (27 January 1958; 19 August 1957) informed John Hicks that
he was unambiguously an adherent of the Keynesian revolution but that he thought
“we strengthen the revolution by dropping the false issue of ‘unemployment
equilibrium’ of which so much has been made in the past … Keynesian economics
can and should be restated in a way that it remains valid even after we do take account
of” the real balance effect [emphasis in original].xxv
Shortly afterwards, Friedman (1965 [1958], 106) argued before the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress that the money supply should grow at a
“predesignated rate”. Further supporting evidence was presented in ‘The Demand for
Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results’ (Friedman 1959). Patinkin (16
November 1959) then wrote to Friedman to complain that “As an aside, I might add
that my only other objection to your [1956] essay is its refusal to recognise the
strongly Keynesian flavour of the analysis it presents … to me it seems that with
perhaps one exception (Karl Schlesinger) an exposition with the contents and spirit of
yours could not have been written (and was not written) before Keynes. I find it
particularly difficult to accept your implication that your essay represents the kind of
thing that was taught at Chicago by Knight, Viner, Simons and Mints. My own
recollections are different”.xxvi
Shortly after he returned to Chicago, Friedman attempted to read “between the lines”
in connection with Wesley Clare Mitchell. Friedman sought to defend the BurnsMitchell National Bureau of Economic Research methodology, which had been
derided by the structural econometricians as “measurement without theory”
(Koopmans 1947).xxvii Mitchell induced in Friedman (1950, 465, 489, 478-9) a
feeling of “exasperation, because numerous significant theoretical insights are so
carefully hidden”.xxviii He attempted to rescue Mitchell’s work and to elevate it as “a
contribution to economic theory of the first magnitude”. Friedman believed that “the
theoretical insights are there after one pierces their protective coloring”. He explained
the process by which he intended to enable “economists … to rediscover [the]
essential elements” of Mitchell’s work: “The aim of the free rendering that follows is
to show that an integrated business-cycle theory can be constructed from – or read
into – Mitchell’s work and to express it in terms that bring out its similarities and
dissimilarities to other existing theories”.
His Chicago colleague, Lloyd Metzler (25th September 1950), complained in
correspondence to Friedman that “I do not share your views concerning the relative
merits of Mitchell’s theory and later theories of the business cycle. I doubt very much
whether you would be able to interpret Mitchell as you have done in the absence of
later developments by Keynes and others”.xxix Friedman later admitted that “I tried …
in the article I wrote on [Mitchell] to sort of play fast and loose and try to construct an
analytical theory”.xxx But the disagreement with Metzler - like the disagreement with
Patinkin prior to 1968 – remained in the private domain.
Likewise, Nicholas Kaldor (1970, 54, n1) referred to an anti-Monetarist tradition,
which remained quasi-oral (included his “written and oral evidence” to the 1958
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Radcliffe Committee). But Friedman could no longer be dismissed so casually: “It is
a tribute to Friedman’s growing influence (in the U.K., as well as the U.S.) that I
thought it worth-while to publish a paper solely devoted to a criticism of his views in
1970 which I did not think worth-while twelve years before”.
Twelve years after the publication of Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money
Patinkin became determined to bring the issue to a head in the public domain. On 27
November 1968, he wrote to Friedman enclosing a draft of an essay that was to be
published in the first issue of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (JMCB) in
which he documented what he believed to be the falsity of Friedman’s account of the
Chicago tradition (chapter 5 [1969/1981]). Harry Johnson (chapter 8 [1971]),
Friedman’s Chicago colleague (1959-1977) and former editor of the JPE, expanded
upon Patinkin’s essay to provide a wider critique of Friedman’s scholarship and
integrity.
Friedman (1962) dedicated Capitalism and Freedom to his two children “and their
contemporaries who must carry the torch of liberty on its next lap”. Johnson (chapter
8 [1971], 11) concluded that Patinkin had shown “specifically that the Chicago
quantity theorists – Simons and Mints - were no different from their quantity theory
colleagues elsewhere in these respects. There was no lonely light constantly burning
in a secret shrine on the Midway, encouraging the faithful to assemble in waiting for
the day when the truth could safely be revealed to the masses; that candle was made,
and not merely lit, only when its light had a chance of penetrating far and wide and
attracting new converts to the old time religion”.
The Patinkin-Johnson assaults provided anti-monetarist ammunition to many of
Friedman’s opponents including Tobin and Paul Samuelson (both associated with the
Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis and the policy process in President Kennedy’s
White House). In his JPE obituary of Viner, Samuelson (1972, 11) asserted that it
was “a perversion of history to believe that there was an oral tradition at the
University of Chicago which had already anticipated the valid nucleus of Keynesian
analysis”. Tobin (chapter 10 [1981], 30) regretted that “the flaws Johnson detected
[in monetarism] have not yet proved fatal”.
1.4 Early Disputes over the Quantity Theory
From its formation, the Chicago Economics department and its journal, the JPE, had
been involved in heated controversy over the quantity theory. J. Laurence Laughlin
the founding chairman of the department and the founding editor of the JPE (1892-5)
was a relentless critic of the quantity theory (Dorfman 1959, 419; Bornemann 1940,
4). Laughlin’s (1903) work stimulated Kemmerer (1907) and Irving Fisher (1911) to
restate and defend the quantity theory (Mehrling 1997, 32). Throughout his career
Laughlin engaged Fisher on the quantity theory: Chicago versus Yale “with the sides
reversed” (Friedman 1974, 14-15).xxxi
Laughlin took his campaign to the public; taking two years leave (1911-13) from
Chicago to act as full-time chairman of the National Citizens League to press for
banking reform. Friedman (1987) noted that Laughlin’s economics was “marred by
dogmatic and rigid opposition to the quantity theory”. Paul Douglas (1972, 42, 334)
arrived at the University of Chicago in 1920: “over the years I developed a greater
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faith in [Laughlin’s] ideas and even less reliance on the rigid quantity theory as the
sole factor in the general price level”.
Presumably referring to Keynes (JMK 1983, 11 [1911], 375-76), Laughlin complained
about “the recrudescence of the archaic quantity theory of money in Great Britain”
(Laughlin 1918, 117). In The Federal Reserve Act its Origin and Problems, Laughlin
(1933, 222, 229, 231-2) continued to abuse the quantity theory, and Fisher and his
“unquestionable error”. Moreover, Laughlin asserted that “the American inflationist
school of Irving Fisher has called in for reinforcement … John Maynard Keynes”.
Keynes’ “remarks on the abandonment of the British gold standard and the sacerdotal
nature assigned to the influence of the quantity of money on prices are scarcely
credible”.
H. Parker Willis acquired his aversion to the quantity theory from Laughlin, his
Chicago colleague and former teacher (Dorfman 1959, 314-5).xxxii Laughlin and
Willis were two of the architects of the Federal Reserve Act (White 1983, 115).
Willis became Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board (1918-22) and was the
founding President of the Stable Money Association (Fisher 1934, 106, 360;
Sandilands 1990, 64).xxxiii Laughlin, however, had to exert his influence on the
Federal Reserve Board via Willis because a Democrat was in the White House and to
the “Democrats, Laughlin was persona non grata” (Mitchell 1941, 878; Friedman
1987).xxxiv
W. Allen Wallis (1976 [1964], 102) noted that Friedman was “persona non grata in
the Federal Reserve Board”. Citing Mints (1945), Friedman (1960, 26, 43) argued
that the Federal Reserve Board had been “set up by men mostly wedded to that
ubiquitous fallacy, the real bills doctrine”. According to Friedman, this fallacy had
contributed to the confusion “between what might be called the ‘monetary’ effects of
monetary policy – the effect on the stock of money – and the ‘credit’ effects – the
effects on recorded rates of interest and other conditions in the credit market … An
ancient example of the confusion is the ‘real bills’ fallacy already referred to. More
recently, the change in economic ideas associated with the name of John Maynard
Keynes led to an almost complete neglect of the ‘monetary’ effects of monetary
policy and concentration on the ‘credit’ effects”.
According to Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963, 193), one of the consequences of
this acceptance of the real bills doctrine was that the Federal Reserve began
operations “with no effective legislative criteria for determining the total stock of
money. The discretionary judgement of a group of men was inevitably substituted for
the quasi-automatic discipline of the gold standard … Little wonder, perhaps, that the
subsequent years saw so much backing and filling, so much confusion about purpose
and power, and so erratic an exercise of power”.
Laughlin was an advocate of “an extreme form of the real bills doctrine” (Mehrling
1997, 35-6; see also Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 192, n7). Mints (1950, 6-7; 1945,
5) regarded the real bills doctrine as “almost wholly fallacious”; it was “utterly
subversive of any rational attack on the problems of monetary policy”. This aversion
to the real bills doctrine (and the incompetent discretion associated with it) linked the
dominant monetary economists of the first and second-generation Chicago School
“rules party” (Mints and Friedman) to members of the third generation.
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Friedman was not the first Chicago economist to offer a restatement of the quantity
theory by reading between the lines. In the JPE, Willis (1896, 448, 441) noted that
the quantity theory was “gradually losing ground amongst economists” but “had lost
none of its hold on upon the public mind”. Willis sought to provide “a clear
restatement of the quantity theory”. He noted the difficulties involved in such a
project but concluded that “by comparison of the various bits of exposition on the
subject a theory fairly consistent with itself may, if too great nicety in the use of terms
is not demanded, be culled from the recent writings of believers in the doctrine”.
Friedman (1972, 12) later repeated Fisher’s rebuttal to Laughlin that “the quantity
theory is in essence correct. What it needs is to be restated not rejected”. It was this
‘Restatement’ that Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 3, 21) provided, by “reading between
the lines” as Willis had done six decades before.
Nor was Friedman the first economist to make an assertion about the existence of a
quantity theory oral tradition. On two occasions, Keynes made similar assertions: in his
review of Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money (1911) and in his obituary of Alfred
Marshall (JMK 1983, XI [1911], 375-76; X [1924], 189; see also Whitaker 1975, 16478). According to Johnson, Friedman self-consciously imitated the tactics of the
Keynesian revolution so as to further his counter-revolution.xxxv Johnson (1970, 85-6,
107 n48) speculated that during his year “as a visitor at Cambridge [1954], Friedman
became enamoured of the ‘Cambridge oral tradition’ as a concept permitting the
attribution to an institution of a wisdom exceeding that displayed in its published
work, and unconsciously stole a leaf from Cambridge’s book for the benefit of his
own institution”.xxxvi
Edward Cannan (1927 [1922], 311), of the London School of Economics (LSE),
noted that to “outsiders” the “Cambridge School of Economics” appeared “as
somewhat of a ‘sect’”.xxxvii Cannan also attempted to expropriate the analysis of
money demand as an LSE oral tradition after having earlier disagreed with Keynes.
In a review of Keynes’ Tract on Monetary Reform, Cannan (1927 [1924], 371-2) took
up the “gauntlet” which Keynes had thrown down. Cannan argued that it was
important for the stability of the financial system that the quantity theory was seen to
be part of the body of economic theory which is perceived to be “generally true”.
Distracting attention away from the money supply towards money demand would
“constantly tend to make people disbelieve in the workings of the quantity theory”.
xxxviii

In his rejoinder, Keynes (JMK XI [1924], 415, 419) argued that there could be “both
very large and very rapid” changes in “the volume of real balances”. Keynes
complained that Cannan was “unsympathetic with nearly everything worth reading …
which has been written on monetary theory in the last ten years”. The “almost
revolutionary improvement in our understanding of the mechanism of money and
credit and of the analysis of the trade cycle … may prove to be one of the most
important advances in economic thought ever made”. Cannan was guilty of writing
“as though the last word had been said years ago in elementary textbooks”. In
contrast to Cannan’s work, Keynes commended the “impressive” collection of
opinions on the topic provided by J.R. Bellerby (1923) “from many sources”. Cannan
(1927 [1924], 384, 386-7) responded by purporting to analyse “what these textbooks
really did say”. Referring to Keynes’ 1923 “restatement of the quantity theory” and
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heightened perceptions about the importance of hoarding and “the demand for
currency” Cannan reported that “rummaging through old lecture notes, I find I was
teaching it orally ten years before I put it in a book in 1918”.xxxix
1.5 Other Oral Traditions
Richard Kahn’s English translation of Knut Wicksell’s Interest and Prices was
published in 1936. It is possible that Keynes learnt of Wicksell’s economics through
an oral tradition (Skidelsky 1992, 168).xl Alternatively, Keynes may have read
Wicksell (1907) in the Economic Journal, or an earlier German edition of Interest and
Prices, or may have been exposed to Wicksell’s ideas through Kahn (Laidler 1991,
149, 152, n30). Kahn (1933, 1, 14, 6), who visited Chicago in 1932-3, also made an
assertion about the existence of an oral tradition. He noted that the marginal revenue
curve had been developed by “a number of independent workers”: Edward
Chamberlin in Harvard and Austin Robinson in Cambridge. Kahn also “realised that
by a curious coincidence precisely the same term was in use at Chicago” by Viner and
Theodore Yntema. Kahn also referred to “a general theory” and a Cambridge oral
tradition: “Mr Shove has, by way of oral teaching, long been engaged in following up
the same lines of thought”.
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969], 252) and his research assistant, Stanley Fischer, located a
Chicago oral tradition in George Bach’s Chicago dissertation on ‘Price Level
Stabilisation Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations’. Acknowledging his
“deep obligation” to Mints, Simon and Viner, Bach (1940, iii, 36, n1) explained that
he was especially grateful to Mints for the “reductions to essentials” of his theory,
“although it has been in the nature of an ‘oral tradition’ at Chicago for some time and
can be found in many writers, but only more or less obscured. (Note, e.g. Vol 1 of
Keynes’ Treatise)”. This Chicago oral tradition related to psychological factors
which changed the “propensity to hoard consume and invest”, “perverse fluctuations
in the volume of money in the system” and “the existence of ‘sticky’ prices
throughout large sections of the economy, of which many are cost-prices, so that costs
have a tendency to move more slowly than do the more flexible selling prices”.
This sticky price tradition played a pivotal role separating Keynes’ analysis of
liquidity preference from his contemporaries in Viner’s (chapter 48 [1936], 240)
review of the General Theory: “In modern monetary theory [hoarding] is generally
dealt with, with results which in kind are substantially identical with Keynes’, as a
factor operating to reduce the ‘velocity’ of money. There has been, I believe,
common agreement among economists that when price rigidities are important
hoarding could present a serious and continuing, and that it is always a significant
factor in the downward phase of a short business cycle. Keynes, however, attaches
great importance to it as a barrier to ‘full’ employment at almost all times, and
apparently irrespective of the degree of flexibility of prices”.xli Friedman (1968, 3)
noted that Pigou’s analysis of the behaviour of real money balances exploded
“Keynes’ key theoretical proposition, namely, that even in a world of flexible prices, a
position of equilibrium at full employment might not exist.
Henceforth,
unemployment had again to be explained by rigidities or imperfections, not as the
natural outcome of a fully operative market process”.
Simons (1948 [1944], 131-2) used sticky prices to build an expectations-augmentedinsider-outsider model of the labour market. Where trade unions had power and
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labour turnover was costly to firms, insiders could “insulate themselves from the
competition of new workers merely by making their costs excessive, that is, by
establishing labor costs and wage expectations [emphasis added] which preclude
expansion of production or employment in their field”. Thus outsiders (“new and
displaced workers”) would not “typically migrate” to such firms because “jobs cannot
be had”. The privately optimal strategy for trade unions was to exclude “lower-wage
competitors”. Douglas (1935, 54-5, 61), citing Gardiner Means, also emphasised the
causal importance of “stickiness in prices” in his Controlling Depressions. Thus “an
examination of the actual facts of industry” revealed that “rigid prices in the face of
falling costs” were “probably the chief initiating causes of the present depression.xlii
According to Martin Bronfenbrenner, in the late 1930s “Simons agreed with Means
that administered prices were delaying recovery and should come down. (But Simons
was more down on trade union wages than on industrial prices)” (cited by Samuels
and Medema 1990, 169, n55). Means used this analysis to implicitly demonstrate the
invalidity of the quantity theory: “In the modern economy, the widespread presence of
inflexible prices makes any changes in the relation between the supply of money and
the demand for money under given price conditions a seriously disorganising force”.
In the “old flexible-price economy” changes in money demand or supply would lead
to price changes which would leave production relations “essentially undisturbed”. In
the modern economy, a monetary contraction would dislocate the price relationships
and produce a decline in output in the inflexible price sector (Ware and Means 1936,
79-81). A “serious and continuing depression” could follow such a policy.
Alternatively, the same outcome could result from the monetary authorities failing to
allow the money supply to keep pace with money demand, a scenario that Means
(1935, 409-10) advanced as a partial explanation of the Great Depression. Thus a
stabilising monetary policy would require the authorities to adjust the money supply
so as to eliminate any pressure towards “a general revision of prices either upwards or
downwards” [emphasis in original].
1.6 Chicago and the Keynesian Revolution
In his AEA Presidential Address, Knight (1951, 2-3) hinted at the existence of a
Chicago oral monetary tradition: “It has long been my habit to mention to classes the
sinister import of such intellectual phenomena as … the perpetual popular demand for
making capital cheap by manufacturing money”. Knight noted that during his career
several “movements” had denigrated the term “orthodox” as “a ‘cuss-word’, an
epithet of reproach … the latest ‘new economics’ and in my opinion rather the worst,
for fallacious doctrine and pernicious consequences, is that launched by the late John
Maynard (Lord) Keynes, who for a decade succeeded in carrying economic thinking
way back to the dark age”.
Keynes read between the lines to construct his “classical” straw man caricature.xliii
Keynes (1936, 3, n1, 175, 177-8) opened the General Theory with the admission that
much of what followed was possibly a “solecism” with respect to his characterisation
of the “classical” economists in general and the “Classical Theory of the Rate of
Interest” in particular. But the absence of compelling textual evidence did not prevent
Keynes from establishing a potent rhetorical device. Thus Alfred Marshall must have
believed that the interest rate was determined by equilibrating investment and savings
although this explanation “is not to be found in Marshall’s Principles in so many
words. Yet his theory seems to be this, and it is what I myself was brought up on …
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[Marshall] surely believed, although he did not expressly say so, that aggregate
savings and aggregate investment are necessarily equal”.xliv
In his review of the General Theory, Knight (chapter 50 [1937], 101, 114, 122, n22)
complained that Keynes’ references to “classical economists” were “the sort of
caricatures which are typically set up as straw men for purposes of attack in
controversial writing”. He sought to defend his own Chicago teaching from Keynes’
influence: “In the great majority of cases the doctrines so labelled [as classical] seem
to me to be quite at variance with, and often contradictory to anything I was ever
taught as academic doctrine in any modern sense … and they are certainly alien to
anything I have ever taught as such, and I have been rated, and have supposed myself,
an adherent of the general type of position referred to by the term. On the other hand,
many of Mr Keynes’s own doctrines are, as he would proudly admit, among the
notorious fallacies to combat which have been considered a main function of the
teaching of economics”. Knight noted that “where once it was necessary in writing to
pose as merely restating and interpreting doctrine handed down from the Fathers, the
surest way to public interest and acclaim now lies through pulling down and
overturning everything established or accepted”.
Patinkin (like Friedman) offered a ‘Restatement’ of the doctrines of the Chicago
Fathers. In ‘Price Flexibility and Full Employment’ Patinkin (1952 [1948], 278), then
an assistant professor at Chicago, concluded that “in a static world with a constant
stock of money, price flexibility assures full employment … But in the real dynamic
world in which we live, price flexibility with a constant stock of money might
generate full employment only after a long period; or might even lead to a
deflationary spiral of continuous unemployment. On either of these grounds, a full
employment policy based on a constant stock of money and price flexibility does not
seem to be very promising. All that this means is that a full employment policy
cannot be the fairly simple one of maintaining a constant stock of money and waiting
for the economic system to generate full employment automatically through price
declines. Other policies will be required. One possible alternative policy can be
inferred from the Haberler-Pigou analysis itself: there are two ways to increase real
balances. One is to keep the money stock constant and permit prices to fall. An
equally effective way is to maintain the price level constant, and increase the stock of
money by creating a government deficit”. Patinkin then added a footnote:
“Considered from this perspective, the Pigou analysis presents in a rigorous fashion
part of the theoretical framework implicit in the fiscal-monetary policy of the SimonsMints position”.
Patinkin’s Restatement of the doctrines of the Chicago Fathers made an important
contribution to the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis. With respect to “the
Keynesian-classical polemic” Patinkin (1952 [1948], 253, 257-8, 260) believed that
he had demonstrated that “these two camps have really come closer and closer
together”. Patinkin also asserted that “a successful restatement of the classical
position must demonstrate the existence of some automatic mechanism which will
always bring about full employment … To the Keynesian negative interest rate
argument replies had been made by both Haberler and Pigou … by changing the real
value of cash balances, desired full employment savings and investment can always
be equated at a positive rate of interest”.
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In 1947, Friedman provided Patinkin with detailed (‘early and often’) comments on at
least two drafts of his paper. When the essay was reprinted in an AEA volume edited
by Friedrich Lutz and Mints (1952), Patinkin (1952, 252, n, 261) added four sentences
“as a result of discussions with Milton Friedman” which followed from this
discussion of cash balances: “It should also be emphasised, as Haberler does, that
although this argument has been presented above as an answer to Keynes, it is of
much older origin. In particular, it is implicit in classical theorising on the quantity
theory of money. The crucial step in this analysis, it will be recalled, comes at the
point where it is argued that as a result of increasing the amount of money in the
economy, individuals’ cash balances are larger than desired at the existing price level,
so that they will attempt to reduce these real balances by increasing their money
expenditure. The main contribution of Haberler and Pigou is to show how this set of
forces must, and can, be introduced into the Keynesian analytical apparatus”.
The year before the General Theory was published, Knight (1935, 236) described the
economic doctrines of “the classical school” as “a mixture of a more or less scientific
analysis of a price economy with what is really political propaganda for laissez-faire”.
But as Kenneth Boulding (1956, 136, 138), one of Friedman’s fellow Chicago
graduate students noted, the Keynesian “bulldozer” had left “the orthodox laissez faire
man” stranded. Alvin Hansen played the role of the “American Keynes”. Simons
wrote to Keynes describing himself as “a vigorous but inconspicuous participant in
recent monetary-fiscal controversies” adding that he was “bitterly anti-Hansen and, if
not wholly anti-Keynesian, utterly opposed to your more extreme American disciples”
(cited by Patinkin (chapter 46 [1981/1979], 304-5). Hansen favoured a “dynamic
approach” - which stood in contrast to the passive acceptance of “the play of ‘natural’
forces … many economists are coming to think that action along these traditional
lines would by itself be wholly inadequate. It is increasingly understood that the
essential foundation upon which the international security of the future must be built
is an economic order so managed and controlled that it will be capable of sustaining
full employment” (Hansen and Kindleberger 1942, 467). In response, Simons (1948
[1942], 199) referred disparagingly to “Hansen and his school”.
Hansen (chapter 52 [1946], 73) also saw the post war cleavage widening: “It may now
be useful to contrast the Mints-Simons program with that urged by [Abba P.] Lerner”.
Howard Ellis (chapter 53 [1946], 74) saw the dispute as a confrontation between “a
political wing favoring a very large amount of government activity, and another wing
which, mistrustful of the concentrated power which the bureaucracy would possess
under these circumstances, would reduce it to a minimum”.xlv
In contrast, Patinkin (1952 [1948], 282) thought that “although these positions are
quite distinct theoretically, their policy implications are very similar … Thus the
policies may advocate tax reductions to stimulate consumption and investment (the
Simons-Mints school); or may insist on direct government investment to supplement
private investment (Hansen, et al.)”. But Friedman (chapter 2 [1956]) found the
Simons-Mints school to be the inspiration for a policy proposal (the x% money
growth rule) which contrasted markedly with the consensual policy implication
derived by Patinkin.
Thus four paragraphs of Friedman’s introductory essay launched an intense and wideranging debate that spawned important contributions to theory, methodology and the
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history of thought, and that also profoundly influenced popular ideology and political
action. These two volumes are devoted to all these implications. Section one of this
volume reconstructs the initial controversy: Friedman’s initial essay (chapter 2
[1956]) plus an essay on ‘The Monetary Theory and Policy of Henry Simons’
(chapter 3 [1967]) and the offending encyclopaedia entry on ‘The Quantity Theory of
Money’ (chapter 4 [1968]). Chapters 5 ([1981/1969]) and 6 ([1974/1972]) constitute
the basis of Patinkin’s case; chapter 7 (1974/1972]) Friedman’s only published
response. In Chapter 8, on ‘The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist CounterRevolution’, Johnson ([1971]) expands on Patinkin’s essay original essay. The
following chapters by David Laidler (chapter 9 [1981]) and Tobin (chapter 10 [1981])
provide some additional background about the nature of the monetarist assault on
orthodoxy. Interestingly, Laidler – a monetarist, and a distinguished monetary
historian – takes Patinkin’s side of the debate. Chapters 11 and 12 set the dispute in
the wider context of the Patinkin-Friedman friendship and the political and
ideological disputes of the time.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bach, G.L. 1940. Price Level Stabilisation: Some Theoretical and Practical
Considerations. Unpublished Dissertation: University of Chicago.
Backhouse, R. 2002. Don Patinkin – Interpreter of the Keynesian Revolution.
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought Summer: 9.2: 186-202.
Barro, R. 1998. Tribute on the Quad. Hoover Digest 4: 1-9.
Berle, A.A. 1973. Navigating the Rapids, 1918-71. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Edited by B. Berle and T. Jacobs.
Beschloss, M.R. and Cronin, T.E. 1989. Eds. Essays in Honor of James MacGregor
Burns. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
Bellerby, J.R. 1923. Control of credit as a remedy for unemployment. London: P.S.
King and Son.
Blumenthal. S. 1986. The rise of the counter-establishment from conservative ideology
to political power. New York: Times.
Bornemann, A. 1940. J. Laurence Laughlin Chapters in the Career of an Economist.
Washington: American Council on Public Affairs.
Boulding, K. 1956. Economics – the Taming of Mammon. In White ed.
Burns, A.F. 1929. Quantity Theory and Price Stabilisation. American Economic Review
December: XIX.4: 561-79.
Cannan, E. 1918. Money Its Connection with Rising and Falling Prices. London: P.S.
King and Son. First edition.

15
___ 1927. An Economist’s Protest. London: P.S. King and Son.
__ 1932. The Demand for Labour. Economic Journal September 167.XLII: 357-370.
___ 1935. Money Its Connection with Rising and Falling Prices. London: P.S. King and
Son. Eighth edition.
Coats, A.W. 1967. Alfred Marshall and the Early Development of the London School of
Economics. Economica November: 408-17.
Conkin, P. 1968. The New Deal. London: Routledge and Kegan.
Croome, D. R. and Johnson, H. G. 1970. Eds. Money in Britain 1959-1969. London:
Oxford University Press.
Currie, L. 1978. Comments and Observations. History of Political Economy 10:4: 5418.
Dahrendorf, R. 1995. LSE A History of the London School of Economics and Political
Science, 1895-1995. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Davis, J.R. 1971. The New Economics and the Old Economists.
University of Iowa Press.

Ames, Iowa:

Dean, E. 1965. Ed. The Controversy over the Quantity Theory of Money. London: D.C.
Heath.
Desai, M. 1981. Testing Monetarism. London: Francis Pinter.
Dorfman, J. 1959. The Economic Mind in American Civilisation. New York: Viking.
Volume 4.
Douglas, P. 1935. Controlling Depressions. London: George Allen and Unwin.
___ 1972. In the Fullness of Time. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Eatwell, J, Milgate, M and Newman, P. eds. 1987. The New Palgrave A Dictionary of
Economics. London; Macmillan.
Fisher, I. 1911. The Purchasing Power of Money. New York: Macmillan.
___ 1934. Stable Money A History of the Movement. New York: Adelphi.
Friedman, M. 1950. Wesley C. Mitchell as an Economic Theorist. Journal of Political
Economy December LVIII.6: 465-493.
___ 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
___ 1956. ed. Studies in The Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

16

___ 1957. Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
__ 1959. The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results. Journal
of Political Economy 67, June: 327-51.
___ 1960. A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham University Press.
___ 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. First
Edition.
___ 1965. The Supply of Money and Changes in Prices and Output. In Dean ed.
___ 1968. The Role of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review LVIII.1, March:
1-17.
___ 1969. Has Fiscal Policy Been Oversold? In Friedman and Heller.
___ 1972. Have Monetary Policies Failed. American Economic Review May: 11-18.
___ 1974. Schools at Chicago. University of Chicago Magazine: 11-16.
___ 1977. Nobel Lecture Inflation and Unemployment. Journal of Political Economy
85, June: 451-72.
___ 1987. J. Laurence Laughlin. In Eatwell et al. eds: 139-40.
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. First Edition.
Friedman, M and Friedman, R. 1980. Free to Choose: a Personal Statement. New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1982. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. Second Edition.
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1984. Tyranny of the Status Quo. London: Secker and
Warburg.
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1998. Two Lucky People. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Friedman, M. and Heller, W. W. 1969. Monetary versus fiscal policy a dialogue.
New York: W. W. Norton.
Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States.
Princeton: Princeton UP.

17
Fusfeld, D. 1956. The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of
the New Deal. New York: Columbia University Press.
Gideonse, H.D. 1938. The Commodity Dollar. University of Chicago: Public Policy
Pamphlet No.26.
Gideonse, H.D., Hansen, A.H. and Jacoby, N.H. 1938. Purchasing Power and
Prosperity. University of Chicago Round Table transcript. July 31.
Gilbert, J.C. 1953. The Demand for Money: The Development of an Economic
Concept. Journal of Political Economy April: 144-59.
Ginzberg, E. 1990. Economists at Columbia: Recollections of the Early 1930s.
American Economist: 14-19.
Gould, J.M. and Kelley, A.M. 1949. Eds. Lecture Notes on Types of Economic
Theory As Delivered by Professor Wesley C. Mitchell. New York: Augustus Kelley.
Vol II.
Graham, O.T. 1989. Franklin Roosevelt and the Intended New Deal. In Beschloss
and Cronin eds.
Greenfield, H.I., Levenson, A.M. Hamovitch, W. and Rotwein, E. Eds. 1979. Theory for
Economic Efficiency Essays in Honour of Abba P. Lerner. London: MIT Press.
Hacker, L.M. 1954. The Anticapitalist Bias of American Historians. In Hayek ed.
Hamilton, E.J. Rees, A. and Johnson, H.G. 1962.
Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago.

eds.

Landmarks in Political

Hansen, A. H. and Kindleberger, C. P. 1942. The economic tasks of the post-war
world. Foreign Affairs: 466-476.
Harris S. E. 1935. Professor Pigou's Theory of Unemployment. Quarterly Journal of
Economics XLIV, 286-234.
Harrod, R. 1951. The Life of John Maynard Keynes. London: Macmillan.
Hartwell, R.M. 1995. A History of the Mont Pelerin Society. Liberty Fund: Indianapolis.
Hayek, F. A. 1939. Freedom and the Economic System. University of Chicago Public
Policy Pamphlet No.29.
___ 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago.
___ 1954. Ed. Capitalism and the Historians. Chicago: University of Chicago.
___ 1967. Studies in philosophy, politics and economics. London: Routledge.
Heller, W. 1969. Is monetary policy being oversold? In Friedman and Heller.

18

Henriksson, R.G.H. 1989. The Institutional Base of the Stockholm School: The Political
Economy Club (1917-1951). History of Economics Society Bulletin 11.1, Spring: 5977.
Hobsbawm, E. 1994. The Age of Extremes The Short History of the Twentieth Century
1914-1991. London: Michael Joseph.
Johnson, H.G. 1962. Monetary Theory and Policy. American Economic Review 52:
335-84.
___ 1970. Recent Developments in Monetary Theory - A Commentary. In Croome
and Johnson eds.
___ 1975. On Economics and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kahn, R. F. 1933. Imperfect Competition and the Marginal Principle. Unpublished
Mimeo. In the Kahn Papers, Modern Archives Collection, King’s College
Cambridge.
Kaldor, N. 1970. Reply. Lloyds Bank Review October: 54-55.
Karl, B.D. 1983. The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kemmerer, E.W. 1907. Money and Credit in Relation to General Prices. New York:
Holt.
___ 1933. Discussion. Federal Reserve Policy Since 1926. American Economic
Review March: 130-4.
___ 1934a. Kemmerer on Money. London: George Routledge and Sons.
___ 1934b. Controlled Inflation. American Economic Review Supplement March: 90100.
___ 1935. Money: the principles of money and their exemplification in outstanding
chapters of monetary history. New York: Macmillan.
Keynes, J.M. 1923. A Tract on Monetary Reform. London: Macmillan.
___ 1930. A Treatise on Money: The Applied Theory of Money. London: Macmillan.
__1936. The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London:
Macmillan.
___ 1972-89. Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. London: Macmillan.
Keynes, J.N. 1891. The Scope and Method of Political Economy. London: Macmillan.

19
Koopmans, T.C. 1947. Measurement without Theory. Review of Economics and
Statistics August: 161-72.
Knight, F. 1935. The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays. Book for Libraries
Press: New York.
___ 1940. ‘What is Truth’ in Economics? Journal of Political Economy XLVIII.1,
February: 1-32.
___ 1941. The Business Cycle, Interest and Money: A Methodological Approach.
Review of Economic Statistics XXIII.2, May: 53-67.
___ 1951. The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics. American Economic
Review XLI.1 March: 1-29.
Laidler, D. 1991. The Golden Age of the Quantity Theory. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
___ 1999. Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution: Studies of the Inter-War Literature on
Money, the Cycle, and Unemployment. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Laughlin, J.L. 1903. Principles of Money. New York: Scribner’s.
___ 1906. Academic liberty. Journal of political economy XIV January: 41-3.
___ 1918. Credit of the Nations. Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York.
___ 1924. Roosevelt at Harvard. The American review of reviews October: 391-8.
__ 1933. The Federal Reserve Act its Origin and Problems. New York: Macmillan.
Lewis, H. G. 1946. Henry Calvert Simons. American Economic Review September:
668-9.
Leuchtenburg, W.E. 1968. Ed. The New Deal: A Documentary History. New York:
Harper and Row.
Lundberg, E. 1994. Studies in Economic Instability and Change. Stockholm: SNS
Forlag. Edited by R. Henriksson.
Lutz, F and Mints, L. eds 1952. Readings in Monetary Theory. American Economic
Association. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Means, G. 1935. Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a Stabilising Monetary
Policy. Journal of the American Statistical Society June: 401-413.
Mehrling, P. 1997. The Money Interest and the Public Interest American Monetary
Thought 1920-1970. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.

20
___ 2001a. Don Patinkin and the Origins of Post War Monetary Orthodoxy. Mimeo.
___ 2001b. Economists and the Fed: Beginnings. Mimeo.
McCloskey, D. 1986. The Rhetoric of Economics. Great Britain: Wheatsheaf.
Mints, L.W. 1945. A History of Banking Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
___ 1950. Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society. New York: McGraw Hill.
Mises, L. von. 1974. Planning for freedom and twelve other essays. Libertarian Press:
Illinios.
Mitchell, W.C. 1941. J. Laurence Laughlin. Journal of Political Economy December:
875-81.
Moggridge, D. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography. Routledge:
London.
Nef, J. U. 1934. James Laurence Laughlin.
February: 1-5.

Journal of Political Economy 42.1,

Newman, P. Milgate, M. and Eatwell, J. 1992. eds The New Palgrave dictionary of
money and finance. London: Macmillan.
Oakeshott, M. 1977. Rationalism in politics and other essays. London: Methuen and Co
Ltd
Patinkin, D. 1952. Price Flexibility and Full Employment. In Lutz and Mints eds.
___ 1956. Money Interest and Prices. Row, Peterson: Evanston, Illinois.
___ 1979. The Development of Keynes’s Policy Thinking. In Greenfield et al. eds.
___ 1981. Essays on and in the Chicago Tradition. Duke University Press: Durham,
North Carolina.
___ 1990. On Different Interpretations of The General Theory. Journal of Monetary
Economics 26: 205-243.
__1993. On the Chronology of the General Theory. Economic Journal May, 103.418:
647-663.
__ 1995. The Training of an Economist. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly
Review December, 195: 359-395.
Reagan, R. 1990. An American Life. Random: London.
Reeve, J.E. 1943. Monetary Reform Movements: A Survey of Recent Plans and
Panaceas. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs.

21

Robbins, L. 1971. Autobiography of an Economist. London: Macmillan.
Robinson, J. 1962. Economic Philosophy. England: Penguin.
Samuels, W. and Medema, S.G. 1990. Gardiner C. Means Institutionalist and Post
Keynesian. New York: M.E. Sharp.
Samuelson, P. 1972. Jacob Viner, 1892-1970. Journal of Political Economy: 5-11.
Sandilands, R. 1990. The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie: New
Dealer, Presidential Adviser and Development Economist. Durham: Duke University
Press.
Saunders, S. 2001. Patinkin and Talmudic Readings in the History of Economics.
Paper presented to the Patinkin conference, Lausanne, September.
Schlesinger, J.R. 1956. After Twenty Years: The General Theory. Quarterly Journal of
Economics: 581-602.
Schlesinger, A.M. 1960. The Politics of Upheaval. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Schumpeter, J. 1954. A History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Selden, R.T. 1962. Stable Monetary Growth. In Yeager ed.
Schwartz, J. A. 1987. Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era.
London: Macmillan.
Simons, H.C. 1933. Mercantilism as Liberalism. Journal of Political Economy
August: 548-551.
___ 1934. Money and the New Deal: Review of Pasvolsky’s Current Monetary
Issues. New Republic February 21: 53-4.
___ 1943. Postwar Economic Policy: Some Traditional Liberal Principles. American
Economic Review March XXXIII.1: 432-445.
___ 1948. Economic Policy for a Free Society. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
___ 1950. Federal Tax Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
___ 1962. Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy. Reprinted in Hamilton, Rees
and Johnson eds.
Skidelsky, R. 1983. John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed 1883-1920. London:
Macmillan.

22
___ 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour 1920-1937. London:
Macmillan.
Smith, B.D. 1992. Real Bills Doctrine. In Newman, Milgate and Eatwell eds, vol
3:298-300.
Solow, R. 1964. Friedman on America’s Money. Banker November: 710-17.
Stigler, G. 1969. Does Economics Have a Useful Past? History of Political Economy
1.2, Fall: 217-230.
___ 1988. Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist. New York: Basic Books
Teigen, R.L. 1962. Demand and Supply Functions for Money in the United States:
Some Structural Estimates.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
___ 1971. Some Observations on Monetarist Analysis. Kredit and Kapital 4: 234-63.
Tugwell, R. 1968. The Brains Trust. New York: Viking.
___ 1972. In Search of Roosevelt. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP.
Wallis, W.A. 1976. An Overgoverned Society. Free Press: London.
Ware, C and Means, G.C. 1936. The Modern Economy in Action. New York: Harcourt
Brace.
Whitaker, J.L. ed. 1975. The Early Economic Writings of Alfred Marshall, 18671890. London: Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society. Volume 1.
White, L.T. Ed 1956. Frontiers of Knowledge in the Study of Man. New York:
Harper and Brothers.
White, E.N. 1983. The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System,
1900-1929. Princeton: Princeton UP.
Whittlesey, C.R. 1935. Banking and the New Deal. Public Policy Pamphlet No. 16.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wicksell, K. 1907. The influence of the rate of interest on prices. Economic Journal
17, June: 213-20.
Willis, H. P. 1896. The History and Present Application of the Quantity Theory.
Journal of Political Economy September: 417-448.
Willis, H. P. and Chapman, J. 1934. The Banking Situation: American Post War
Problems and Developments. New York: Columbia University Press.
Wriston, W. 1998. Tribute on the Quad. Hoover Digest 4: 1-9.

23

Yeager, L.B. 1962. Ed. In Search of a Monetary Constitution. Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard UP.

NOTES
i
I am grateful to seminar participants at Duke University, the Hoover Institution and
the 2001 Patinkin conference plus Tom Cate, Roger Backhouse, Jeff Biddel, William
Coleman, Graeme Dorrance, Mathew Forbes, Robert J. Gordon, Geoffrey Harcourt,
Rolf Henriksson, David Laidler, Cristina Marcuzza, Perry Mehrling, Don Moggridge,
Michael Parkin, Ron Phillips, Dominick Regan, Melvin Reder, Hugh Rockoff,
Annalissa Rosselli, Roger Sandilands, Michael Schneider, Anna Schwartz, Frank
Steindl, George Tavlas, Warren Young and Richard Watson. Gloria Valentine and
the librarians at Special Collections, Duke University, the Modern Archives
Collection, Kings College, Cambridge and the Hoover Institution were, as always,
most helpful. I am grateful to the Modern Archives Collection, King’s College
Cambridge for permission to cite from the Richard Kahn Papers, to the Special
Collections, Duke University, for permission to cite from the Don Patinkin and
Lauchlin Currie Papers, and to the Hoover Institution for permission to cite from the
Friedman Papers. I also thank Roger Sandilands for providing me with copies of
Currie’s letters. I am especially grateful to Milton Friedman for answering my
detailed questions, for being so generous with his time and for allowing me to inspect
his 1932 lecture notes which had been gathering dust for almost seven decades.
These chapters demonstrate that economists cooperate even when they compete.
ii

The term “monetarism” was not apparently coined for another decade, by which
time it had become a real threat to the Keynesian intellectual hegemony.
iii

Both Patinkin (1981, 261) and Rose Friedman (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 38)
took Mints’ Economics 331, “Banking Theory and Monetary Policy”. According to
Milton Friedman’s academic transcript he did not attend that course for credit, but he
recalls sitting in on the lectures (no reading lists for 331 have apparently survived in
the Friedman Papers).
iv

One of the few changes that Friedman made between the first and the final draft of
his December 1967 American Economic Association Presidential Address was to
delete the reference to Knight in the opening sentence: “My revered teacher, Frank
Knight, was fond of quoting Josh Billing’s wry comment ‘The trouble with most
people ain’t ignorance; it’s what they know that ain’t so’. That describes my aim to
night: to persuade you that something you know simply isn’t so”.
v

Patinkin (chapter [1969], 256; chapter [1986], 120) misquotes this sentence twice.
In the first instance Patinkin misquotes “affected” as “influenced”; in the second he
misquotes “analysis” as “theory”.
vi

Both Friedman and Reagan arrived in Chicago in autumn 1932; Reagan (1990, 20)
“hitchhiked to Chicago … with visions of getting a job as a radio announcer”.
Starting in 1933, President Roosevelt helped re-establish confidence in the monetary
system through “the warm and supportive simplicity of his Fireside Chat lessons”
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administered through the radio (Karl 1983, 103). It is interesting to note that the
Chicago oral tradition was supposed to exist just as the radio was transforming mass
communication in the United States. Ten million households in the U.S. had a radio
in 1929; twenty-seven million in 1939 (Hobsbawm 1994, 195-6). During this period,
an amateur monetary reformer, Father Charles Coughlin, emerged as a “radio priest”
(Laidler 1999, 229, n20). Coughlin’s biggest breakthrough came when he acquired
radio access to the Chicago and Cincinnati areas in 1929-30. By early 1934, Fortune
estimated that he had 10 million regular listeners, probably the largest in the world
(Reeve 1943, 132-3, 136).
vii

When Keynes (JMK XX 587) arrived in Chicago in June 1931 he found President
Hoover’s “stock stood incredibly low. There was not a soul who would say good
word for him”.
viii

According to surviving lecture notes, at Harvard in 1903-4, Franklin Roosevelt had
been taught that “The quantity theory holds” (cited by Fusfeld 1956, 31). In 1932,
Roosevelt was re-introduced to the quantity theory in person by Irving Fisher
(Tugwell 1968, 98).
ix

In contrast, Reagan (1990, 230-1, 311) had both faith and a lineage. He was aware
that in 1981 he was facing “what many economists called the greatest economic
emergency since the Great Depression” but he had “faith – faith in those tax cuts and
faith in the American people”. His supply side policies were based on his own oral
tradition (“you say ‘I’m not gonna work for six cents on the dollar’”) with a lineage
descending from “that philosopher, Khaldoon” a fourteenth century Muslim writer on
taxes.
x

Friedman (1987) noted that J. Laurence Laughlin, the founding chairman of the
University of Chicago Economics Department, exerted “no lasting influence on
economic thought”. He might have made an indirect impact: in 1894-5, John Neville
Keynes considered but rejected an offer made by Laughlin to accept a chair at
Chicago (Skidelsky 1983, 65; Moggridge 1992, 16). It is interesting to speculate what
the consequences for the modern configuration of economics would have been had the
Keynes family relocated permanently to Chicago, and had Friedman’s parents not
migrated (separately) to the United States (also in 1894-5).
xi

According to Schumpeter (1954, 223-4), the Physiocrats “formed a group united by
what amounted to a creed; they were indeed what they were called so often, a sect ...
[with] vows to One Master and One Doctrine ... [they were] disciples who absorbed
and accepted the Master's teaching with a fidelity for which there are but two
analogues in the whole history of economics: the fidelity of the orthodox Marxist to
the message of Marx, and the fidelity of the orthodox Keynesians to the message of
Keynes … they founded discussion groups, worked upon individuals and agencies in
key positions (the parliaments especially) and produced a large quantity of popular
and controversial literature [and] economic journalism”. du Pont and his fellow
disciples were “thoroughly alive to the importance of propaganda”.
xii

Karl Popper favoured the title “Periclean Society”; Aaron Director preferred
“Adam Smith-Tocqueville” (Hartwell 1995, 43).
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xiii

Ludwig von Mises (1974 [1952], 170) recalled that at a meeting of the Mt Pelerin
Society, T.S. Ashton, a prominent historian, presented a paper which suggested that
much contemporary history was mere ideology, consisting of “tortured facts” and
“concocted legends”. Hayek also berated the “appalling effects of the use of history
as propaganda” and there was a discussion about history being able to “demonstrate
the importance of freedom in the past” (Hartwell 1995, 40-1, 38). These concerns led
to a 1954 University of Chicago volume on Capitalism and the Historians. One essay
focused on Charles Beard’s responsibility for cultivating the ‘Anticapitalist Bias of
American Historians’ (Hacker 1954). In his introductory essay Hayek (1954, 7, 9, 4)
referred to the “socialist interpretation of history which has governed political
thinking for the last two or three generations … Most people would be surprised to
learn that most of what they believe about these subjects are not safely established
facts but myths, launched from political motives”. Historical beliefs were sometimes
“the effects rather than the cause of political beliefs. Historical myths have perhaps
played nearly as great a role in shaping opinion as historical facts”. Hayek (1967
[1944], 1) prefaced The Road to Serfdom with Acton’s dictum: “few discoveries are
more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of ideas”. In his review of
Simons’ Economic Policy for a Free Society Michael Oakeshott (1977 [1949], 49-50)
argued that it was vital to combat the “deplorable ignorance of the nature of
libertarian tradition itself” because this lack of understanding “threatens liberty”.
xiv

Ronald Teigen’s thesis was supervised by Albert Ando and accepted by Robert
Solow as chair of the graduate studies committee (both Ando and Solow opposed
monetarism). In Solow’s (1964, 710-1) judgement “Although only a small minority
of the profession is persuaded by his opinions, around any academic lunch table on
any given day, the talk is more likely to be about Milton Friedman than about any
other economist”. Teigen (1971, 244) subsequently admitted that it was “not obvious
why monetarism had suddenly become so popular”. Johnson’s (chapter 8 [1971])
critique was approvingly cited and Teigen asserted (without any supporting evidence)
that Patinkin (chapter 5 [1981/1969]) had “shown” that Friedman’s “alleged Chicago
oral tradition” was false.
xv

Arthur F. Burns (1929, 562) noted that it was “true” that economists “cling to one
or another version of [the Quantity Theory] doctrine”.
xvi

Friedman (1968, 1) later used this analysis to denigrate earlier analyses: “Monetary
policy was [perceived as] a string … You could lead a horse to water but you could
not make him drink. Theory by aphorism was soon replaced by Keynes’ rigourous
and sophisticated analysis”.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 410-11, 171)
reinterpreted the Great Depression as a “Great Contraction” with the money supply
falling, rather than rising as Kemmerer suggested. They found Kemmerer’s work
“depressing” and unperceptive. They concluded that his involvement in the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System led him to believe that the system he had
helped create had “once and for all solved problems of liquidity”. They also noted
that during the agitation to establish the Federal Reserve System, Kemmerer’s
contribution to the National Monetary Commission was a monograph on Seasonal
Variations in the Demand for Money and Capital in the United States. Friedman’s
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other major ideological-intellectual opponents were also associated with “systems”:
the Bretton Woods system and the Keynesian system.
xvii

Kemmerer (1934a, 174) was obviously proud of having been a financial adviser to
eleven countries. Roger Sandilands (correspondence 26 March 2002) recalls Lauchlin
Currie complaining that Kemmerer’s advice had left a “wretched legacy” to Latin
American.
xviii

Keynes Papers, L/K/35-8.

xix

Roy Harrod (1951, 460) criticised Keynes for seizing on “isolated passages [from
the mercantilists] to find wisdom that was not really there”. In response to Harrod’s
attempt to persuade him to treat these heretics with less respect, Keynes (JMK XIII
[1935], 650-1) wrote to Joan Robinson explaining that Harrod “strongly objected to
chapter 26 [ultimately chapter 23 of the General Theory] as a tendentious attempt to
glorify imbeciles. I should like to know how it strikes you”. Robinson replied that “I
hope you won't let Roy intimidate you about 26. I think it is important to have it, and
it is very enjoyable to read. I don't think you have overstated matters at all”.
xx

Economists (including Patinkin) often use biblical analogies: Knight (1940), for
example, published an essay on “‘what is Truth’ in Economics?” Patinkin (1995,
388-9) highlighted his studies at the Hebrew Theological College at Chicago (193343) as an influence on his historical studies. Patinkin (1990, 224, n20) detected
religious overtones in post-Keynesian writings. With respect to the Keynesian
revolution, Patinkin (1993, 647) referred to the struggle “for the privilege of having
been vicariously present at that Moment of Truth ...”. Perry Mehrling (2001a)
recounted that Jacob Marshak declined an approached to migrate to Palestine,
suggesting Patinkin (“an ardent Zionist”) as his replacement. Patin kin’s first thesis
topic was ‘The International Economic Position of Palestine’. Patinkin’s widow
informed me that the Federal Bureau of Investigation prevented her and her husband
from migrating to Israel in spring 1948, because they had been procuring military
hardware for the shortly-to-be-established State of Israel. For a discussion of both
‘Patinkin and Talmudic Readings in the History of Economics’ and the role of the
“Oral Torah” in the Jewish tradition, see Saunders 2001.
xxi

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 20.

xxii

Patinkin (1979, 154) noted that Friedman had previously effected an intellectual
revolution by having “monetary policy” redefined as relating to variations in the
money supply rather than changes in interest rates.
xxiii

xxiv

Irving Fisher was an earlier advocate of monetary rules.

Simons (1950, 155, n23) referred to himself as “not enough of a scholar” to
describe the sources of his ideas and having “no fear that bibliophiles will point out an
army of unacknowledged precursors”. The only source for his ideas on income
taxation that he wished to acknowledge was his undergraduate teacher in accounting.
Joan Robinson (1962, 77) noted that “Keynes himself lacked the scruple of a scholar".
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xxv

Don Patinkin Papers: http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/economists/patinkin.

xxvi

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32.

xxvii

In 1933-4, Friedman attended Mitchell’s Columbia University course on ‘Types
of Economic Theory’, lecture notes for which have survived for the year 1934-5. In
his final two sentences of the course Mitchell stated that “the people who are
gradually accumulating this factual knowledge are … laying the basis and actively
contributing to our economic theory at large. I hope that every member of the class in
the future will have some part in this work of developing economic theory” (Gould
and Kelley 1949, 300).
xxviii

In the early 1930s, Mitchell told Erik Lundberg (1994, 497) that “we need
another hundred years of empirical research and knowledge before we can generalise
about causal relations on your level”.
xxix

Metzler continued: “I was quite strongly impressed, as I read your paper, by the
similarity between the theory which you have attributed to Mitchell and Kalecki’s
theory of the business cycle … the similarity between your version of Mitchell and
chapter 6 of Kalecki’s book Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations, is so
striking that seems to me that it might be advisable to make a footnote to his work
somewhere in your paper”. Friedman (30th October 1950) replied that he was “almost
ready to wager that there is no copy in Paris” where he was currently based and was
therefore unable to refer to Kalecki’s book.
Milton Friedman Papers,
Correspondence, Meltzler file.
xxx

In an interview with Jeff Biddle (October 6, 1993). I am grateful to Biddle for
providing me with a transcript of this interview.
xxxi

In 1879, as an instructor in political economy at Harvard, Laughlin (1924, 307)
listened to a paper on “Taxation” presented by two undergraduates, Theodore
Roosevelt and Robert Bacon, a future president of United States and his Secretary of
State. Around the same time, Laughlin (1850-1934) heard Simon Newcomb deliver
some invited lectures at Harvard. It was Newcomb to whom Fisher (1911) dedicated
The Purchasing Power of Money. When an Iowa Senator declared that the University
of Chicago “smelled of [Rockefeller] oil” Laughlin (1906, 41) defended academic
freedom using a monetary analogy: an elastic currency was required to reflect the
state of the business cycle, just as tolerance was required to accommodate unpopular
views. His last academic appointment to Chicago was Jacob Viner (Friedman 1987).
xxxii

Wesley Clare Mitchell told Eli Ginzberg (1997, 3) that Willis had never deviated
from the “hard money” views which he had acquired as a Chicago graduate student
under Laughlin.
xxxiii

Willis (1874-1937) was one of the first to visit Roosevelt after the 1932 election
(Tugwell 1972, 205). From the outset of the Depression, Willis blamed Federal
Reserve officials for the panic (Davis 1971, 35). He denounced the 1935 Eccles
banking bill as “the most dangerous, the most unwarranted, the most insidious
measure” of the New Deal (cited by Schlesinger 1960, 297). During Friedman’s time
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at Columbia, Willis’ Banking Seminar produced a collaborative analysis of The
Banking Situation (Willis and Chapman 1934). Friedman’s (1956) Studies in the
Quantity Theory of Money was the collaborative product of his Chicago Workshop in
Money and Banking, founded in 1953. Friedman attributed the “success” of his
Workshop to the rule “no representation without taxation” (Friedman and Friedman
1998, 208).
xxxiv

Laughlin was a “staunch conservative and Republican” (Neff 1934, 4, 1).

xxxv

Johnson (1975, 124) concluded that in the 1950s, Cambridge people were
“perverting economics in order to defend intellectual and emotional positions taken in
the 1930s”. He was implicitly accusing Friedman of perverting economics by
pretending to be merely defending an intellectual position (or framework) that had not
been (uniquely) taken in Chicago in the 1930s.
xxxvi

In the year before Friedman’s visit to Cambridge a JPE essay on the “checkered
career” of the concept of the demand for money also referred to “the oral tradition at
Cambridge” with respect to Marshall’s use of the “demand-to-hold” approach in the
decades before the publication of his 1923 Money, Credit and Commerce (Gilbert
1953, 145). In a 1871 manuscript on the theory of money, Marshall criticized the
approach to the quantity theory which sought to explain the value of money by reference
to its supply and its velocity. Marshall objected on the grounds that “‘the rapidity of
circulation’ is not the most convenient thing to be made the basis of our investigations”.
Specifically, John Stuart Mill had not adequately delineated the “balancing of
advantages” which underpinned the demand for money (cited in Whitaker 1975, 166-7).
xxxvii

The Keynes-Cannan dispute had been preceded by an earlier “institutional”
dispute between Cannan and Alfred Marshall (Dahrendorf 1995, 211-3; Coats 1967).
Lionel Robbins (1971, 105, 85, 83) recalled that the “slogan” at Cambridge in the
1920s was that it was “all in Marshall” whereas Cannan emphasised “this or that
weakness of ‘old Marshall’”.
xxxviii

Cannan (1932, 369; 1927, xiii, 253, 305, 330, 417) explained that “General
unemployment appears when asking too much is a general phenomenon”. He devoted
his professional life to the cause of removing the “scales ... from the eyes of the
people of Europe” until they forced disinflation upon their reluctant governments by
crying: “Burn your paper money, and go on burning it till it will buy as much gold as
it used to do”. The “thorough deflationist” cure for the “diarrhoea of paper” would be
disagreeable “but so is giving up the practice of over-indulgence in intoxicating
liquor". With respect to the unemployed 'byproduct' of this deflation: “Expectation of
Government assistance only hinders the mobility of existing workers”.
xxxix

However, Cannan’s attempt to establish an LSE oral tradition is not supported by
an examination of the 1918 edition of Money. Cannan (1918, 63) explained that
economists had “long been familiar” with the idea that the value of money depended
“upon the various influences which affect demand and supply” and that to restrain
prices rises the public should “insist on adequate limitation of the supply of money”.
In the eighth edition of Money (after the publication of Keynes’ Treatise), Cannan
(1935, 76, 92) explained that “the Quantity Theory of the value of money singles out
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quantity as the thing on which the value of money may be said to depend, other things
(including Demand) remaining the same. It would be very astonishing if this were not
true”. Cannan believed that the demand for money was fairly stable: “in the absence
of anticipation of future changes the elasticity of demand for money is ‘equal to
unity’”. Prior to his death on 8th April 1935 Cannan’s book on Money went through
eight editions (the Preface to the last edition was dated April 1935). During his time
at the LSE (1922-25), Lauchlin Currie (1978, 541) found inspiration in Cannan’s
insistence of getting “behind the Money Veil” (see the introductory chapter, part two,
below).
xl

Erik Lundberg (1994 [1934], 48) recalled that during his time at Chicago (1931-2)
there was “a real boom of interest in Swedish economics … especially Wicksell’s
thoughts”. Wicksell dominated the Stockholm Political Economy Club both through
his writings and through “the Wicksellian oral tradition. This oral tradition was
probably most important in monetary theory. It is well known that Wicksell in his last
years expressed quite severe criticism of his own earlier work in the quantity theory
tradition. At that time Wicksell actually turned against the quantity theory and
attempted to explain the development of the price level without any reference to the
monetary factors focused on in the equation of exchange” (Henriksson 1989, 63, 67).
xli

This sticky price tradition can be found in Simons’ (1948 [1934], 64-5) ‘Positive
Proposal for Laissez Faire’ in which he explains that it was important to consider
“how different possible [monetary] policy rules would operate given the basic
inflexibilities in the price structure … no monetary system, however perfectly
conceived and administered, can make a free-enterprise system function effectively in
the absence of reasonable flexibility in the price structure”. It can also be found in
Simons’ (1933, 550-1) review of Charles Beard’s America Faces the Future. It was,
Simons stated, “perhaps an incontrovertible position that the excess of booms and
depressions are attributable, on the one hand, to the system of commercial banking
and, on the other, to an exceeding and increasing ‘stickiness’ in many parts of the
price structure … many prices have become quite inflexible and especially resistant to
downward pressure … Mr Beard beseeches us to adopt measures which will make the
‘sticky’ prices as much stickier as possible. To adopt such measures, while neglecting
the problem of money and credit, is to assure the next depression will make the
present one seem altogether trivial”. It was a tradition that Chicago’s Greg Lewis
(1946, 668-9) referred to in his Memorial to Simons. Some policy implications of this
sticky price tradition were outlined by Neil Jacoby, a Chicago Assistant Professor of
Finance: “I think that government policy should be bent towards trying to get rid of
these sticky, rigid elements rather than trying to increase them” (Gideonse, Hansen,
and Jacoby, 1938, 10).
xlii

In Knight’s (1941, 59) ‘The Business Cycle, Interest and Money: A
Methodological Approach’ there is a discussion of sticky intermediate prices and
wages: “Wages are notoriously sticky, especially with respect to any downward
change in the hourly wage-rates, which is the important fact in the unit cost or
marginal cost of products”.
xliii

There is also another oral or more precisely an ethereal tradition in the General
Theory: “Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy
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from some academic scribbler from a few years back” (Keynes 1936, 383).
xliv

In 1956, Keynes’ caricature was defended by John Dunlop on the same grounds
chosen by Friedman: “Keynes’ General Theory … was soon hailed as the manifesto
of a revolution … With respect to public policy, Keynes and his followers scored a
signal victory over the ‘price flexibility school’ but contrary to popular impression
(carefully nurtured by Keynes’ disciples), this latter was a rather small and relatively
powerless group … Keynes attacked the Pigovian theory – the ‘classical’ thought
which had by then reigned supreme for but three years. In dealing with the prePigovian theoretical treatment of wage reductions which was so meagre, Keynes
could only pummel that convenient but difficult to define strawman, Say’s Law. It is
questionable whether Keynes’ caricature could be considered a fair presentation of the
views of his postclassical predecessors”. James Schlesinger (1956, 582, n7), the
author of this commentary, then added the following footnote: “Dunlop has intimated
to me that this statement is unfair to Keynes. He points to a strong ‘body of oral
tradition’ in favor of wage reductions and suggests that the noted article of Edwin
Cannan, ‘The Demand for Labour’ (EJ Sept 1932, 357-70) is illustrative of this
general attitude”. ‘The Demand for Labour’ was Cannan Royal Economic Society
Presidential Address delivered on 26th May 1931 (four days before Keynes left for a
visit to the University of Chicago).
xlv

But as Ellis noted, Mints and Hansen “agree completely” about the need for federal
deficits to combat depressions, though Hansen stressed increasing expenditures while
Mints stressed reducing taxes.

